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When the Meaning of "Plain Error" Isn't
So Plain: Deciphering Plain Error in the
Context of Booker
by JOHN JAY STEIN*
"Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be
omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say
it is better to leave them out of the Legislative."
Thomas Jefferson, July 19, 17891
Introduction
For the better part of two decades, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 ("The Act") and the Guidelines promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission governed the federal criminal
sentencing landscape.2 These Guidelines steered sentencing judges
until January of 2005 when the United States Supreme Court made
the Act and Guidelines advisory. In United States v. Booker, the
Court declared that the sentencing judge's ability to enhance a
sentence based on facts found by the bench, and not the jury, ran
afoul of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.3 Because of this
fundamental inconsistency with the Constitution, the Court removed
the mandatory provision of the Guidelines.!
With this dramatic shift in the sentencing sphere, courts are
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Political Science, University of California, Irvine. I would like to thank Jessica L.
Williams, Erin Morris, Geoff Pittman, and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Editorial Board for helping to bring this project to fruition.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July, 19, 1789), in 15 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1958).
2. See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (stating that
the Sentencing Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987); Booker v. United States, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) (stating that in 2005, the mandatory provision of the Guidelines was
unconstitutional).
3. 543 U.S. at 244.
4. Id. at 259.
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being forced to deal with the question of what is to be done with the
criminal defendants who were subject to unconstitutional judicial
fact-finding prior to Booker. The circuit courts have unanimously
held that criminal defendants that were convicted and had exhausted
all available appeals prior to Booker are entitled to no relief.'
However, the answer for defendants convicted prior to, but appealing
after Booker is not so manifest. The Court has commanded that such
defendants must show "plain error" on the part of sentencing judges
in order to get a new sentencing hearing.6 While this seems like a
fairly bright line, the Court of Appeals has split on what the meaning
of "plain error" is in the context of Booker error.
This article will address how plain error should be handled in
Booker cases. Part I of this article will give a brief overview of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part II will address the Court's
decision in Booker and the foundational cases leading up to it. Part
III will address the three-way circuit split on the meaning on plain
error and the possible problems with these various interpretations.
Finally, Part IV will argue that while some courts may reach the
correct result, no court has correctly analyzed the problem because
the judiciary has failed to detect that Booker error is a constitutional
structural error entitling the criminal defendant to a new sentencing
hearing automatically.
I. The Nuts and Bolts of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines essentially ask the sentencing
judge to place the criminally convicted in the appropriate box on the
sentencing grid. The sentencing grid is a table containing forty-plus
offense levels on the y-axis and six criminal history categories on its x-
axis.7 At the point of intersections for the X and Y values is the total
offense level, which corresponds to a given sentencing range.8 Once
the sentencing range is determined, the sentencing judge is mandated
to hand down a sentence within the limits of the given sentencing
range unless unusual circumstances exist.9
To identify the offense level, the sentencing judge must first find
5. See, e.g., Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2005).
6. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268.
7. Honorable Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging
Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1, 6 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 8.
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what the base level of the offense is according to the applicable
provision of the Guidelines.0 Then, adjustments are made based on
the circumstances and facts surrounding the crime." Finally,
additional adjustments to the offense level may be appropriate based
on "(1) the victim's characteristics, (2) the defendant's role in the
offense, (3) whether the defendant obstructed justice, (4) the
incidence of multiple counts, and (5) whether the defendant accepted
responsibility for his [or her] actions."" It is this calculus that
produces the final offense level.
Criminal History Level is determined by assigning a
predetermined number of points to each of the defendant's past
offenses. 3 Then, the sentencing judge places the defendant in the
criminal history category that corresponds to the point total. 4 Once
armed with the necessary figures for the offense level and criminal
history level, the judge can find the appropriate sentencing range and
sentence accordingly.15 However, in instances when the sentencing
judge finds circumstances "not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission," he or she could choose a sentence
that is above or below the range proposed by the Guidelines. 16
Given the abstractness of the Guidelines, an example may be
instructive. Consider the calculus undertaken by the trial court, as
reviewed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Antonakopoulos.7  Stelios Antonakopoulos was convicted of
embezzlement, which carries a base offense level of four.8 The court,
without the aid of a jury, concluded that the amount of money lost
due to the embezzlement was more than $350,000 but less than
$500,000. Such a loss equated to an increase of eleven levels on the
offense total, bringing the total level to fifteen.9 The court, also
acting without a jury, then enhanced the offense level by four for
10. Id. at 6.




15. Id. Factors taken into account when sentencing within a given range include
"seriousness of the offense, deterrence, public protection, the indicated sentencing range
under the Guidelines, policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, and avoidance of
unwarranted disparities in sentencing .. " Id.
16. Id. at 18.
17. 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
18. Id. at 74.
19. Id.
more than minimal planning and for Antonakopoulous's role in the
offense, taking the grand total to an offense level of nineteen." With
the lowest possible criminal history classification of category one, the
court identified the appropriate range from the sentencing grid to be
thirty to thirty-seven months in prison.21
H. United States v. Booker and Its Family Tree
A. Booker's Facts
When the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari in
Booker, it consolidated a pair of cases dealing with the interplay of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial: the aforementioned
Booker and United States v. Fanfan.22 For the purposes of this article,
the crimes committed by Booker and Fanfan are not as important as
the subsequent procedural events and Supreme Court decision. As
such, the facts will be dealt with briefly.
Freddie J. Booker was charged with possession with intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine. 23  After hearing
evidence that Booker possessed 92.5 grams of narcotics, the jury
returned a guilty verdict.24 Based upon Booker's criminal history and
the verdict returned by the jury, the applicable sentencing range laid
down by the Guidelines was between 210 and 262 months.25
However, during a post trial sentencing hearing, the district court
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker actually
possessed 566 grams of crack above the amount found by the jury and
that he was guilty of obstructing justice.26 These findings raised
Booker's offense level from thrity-two to thirty-six and his applicable
sentencing range to between 360 months and life.
27
Duncan Fanfan was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and
to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine.28
Based on this alone, Fanfan's corresponding sentencing maximum
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220, 227-28 (2005).




27. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004).
28. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228.
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was seventy-eight months.29 However, during the sentencing hearing,
the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan
was responsible for 2500 grams of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of
crack cocaine.30 Also, the judge found Fanfan to be "an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity."'" These
findings increased Fanfan's applicable sentencing range to between
188 to 235 months.32 Nevertheless, the district judge recognized the
Sixth Amendment issues presented by such an increase and chose to
implement the shorter sentence founded on the jury verdict alone.33
B. The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Roots
The majority's opinion in Booker is parceled into two distinct but
related parts. Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of a five Justice
majority, addressed the question of whether the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.34 The
Court answered that question in the affirmative. 5 Justice Breyer, also
writing on behalf of a five vote majority,36 addressed the question of
how to remedy the Sixth Amendment problem. 37  The Court's
solution was to remove the provision in the Guidelines that made
them mandatory.3" While this decision turned the sentencing world
on its ear, it was by no means out of the blue. In fact, Booker
represented the culmination of a modern revolution in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the interplay between mandatory
sentencing and jury trials.
In 1999, the Court took up Jones v. United States and struck
down a federal carjacking statute which called for longer sentences





33. Id. at 229.
34. Id. at 226.
35. Id. at 229.
36. It should be noted that the five Justice majority backing Justice Stevens was not
the same as that of Justice Breyer. In fact the only Justice that was common to both
opinions was Justice Ginsburg. Justice Stevens sported a majority of Justice Scalia, Justice
Souter, Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg. On the other hand, Justice Breyer's opinion
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg. See id. at 225, 244.
37. Id. at 246.
38. Id. at 260.
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in jail for no injury, twenty-five years for serious injury, and life in
prison if the victim was killed.3 9 Facts about the level of injury to the
victim never had to be indicated in the indictment, officially charged,
put to the jury, or proven beyond reasonable doubt." The
Government argued that the scheme simply enumerated sentencing
factors that the judge could constitutionally consider.41 The Court
disagreed and stated that the fairest reading of the statute was that
the level of the injury to the victim amounted to an element of the
crime and that to read it any other way brought into play serious
Sixth Amendment concerns." Though only dealing with the Federal
carjacking statute, the Court noted in footnote 11 of its opinion that
this outcome could lead to the broader but completely permissible
"rule requiring jury determination of facts that raise a sentencing
ceiling. ... " 3
In 2000, the Court was once again asked to determine the role of
the jury in finding facts that increase criminal penalties in Apprendi v.
New Jersey." Apprendi examined the constitutionality of New
Jersey's hate crime "sentence enhancement. 45 The defendant in that
case pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm, which
carried a sentencing range of five to ten years.46 The trial court,
without the aid of a jury, found that the defendant's actions were in
violation of New Jersey's hate crime legislation and handed down a
twelve-year sentencer.4  The Court declared that labeling the hate
crime provision as a "sentencing enhancement," as opposed to an
element, was an instance of distinction without difference. Making
the leap that was threatened in footnote eleven of Jones,49 the Court
stated, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
39. 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999).
40. Id. at 230-31.
41. Id. at 233.
42. Id. at 239.
43. Id. at 251 n.11.
44. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
45. Id. at 468.
46. Id at 469-70.
47. Id. at 471.
48. Id. at 478.
49. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 n.11 (1999).
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reasonable doubt.,
50
In 2004, the Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington went
beyond individual statutes and stuck down the entire sentencing
scheme of the State of Washington because it contravened the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment." In that case, the defendant
pled guilty to kidnapping, which under the Washington sentencing
guidelines carried a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months. 2
The trial judge, without a jury and over the recommendations of the
prosecutor, found that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty"
and increased the sentence to ninety months. 3 The Court overturned
the sentence because the trial judge had failed to heed the rule of
Apprendi that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury ....
Since Washington allowed judges to find facts without a jury that
would raise the sentencing ceiling, the sentence in Blakely and the
scheme that allowed for such judicial fact finding was deemed to be
inapposite with the Sixth Amendment."
In a footnote in Blakely, the Court noted that the Amicus Curiae
brief for the United States urged for the sentence to be affirmed and
noted the differences between Washington's sentencing regime and
the Guidelines. 6 While the Blakely opinion stated that the Court's
opinion did not extend to the Federal sentencing sphere, the writing
was on the wall.57 It was a short leap to extend the reasoning of
Blakely in Booker and strike down the Guidelines. When Booker hit
the Court's docket in 2004, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
Booker, noted the undeniable similarities when he stated, "[T]here is
no distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedure .... 58
Justice Stevens's conclusions in Booker were premised on a fairly
50. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
51. 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
52. Id. at 299.
53. Id. at 300.
54. Id. at 301,305.
55. Id. at 305, 313.
56. Id. at 305 n.9 ("The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to affirm. It notes
differences between Washington's sentencing regime and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines but questions whether those differences are constitutionally significant. See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25-30. The Federal Guidelines are not before us,
and we express no opinion on them.").
57. Id.
58. 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
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straightforward analysis. The Guidelines were necessary and binding
on all judges. 9 The Guidelines imbued judges with the ability to
increase the prescribed sentencing range when the judge found the
existence of mitigating or aggravating factors by a preponderance of
the evidence.5 Such aggravating or mitigating factors did not have to
be found by a jury.6' Blakely stated that the Sixth Amendment
requires that the facts essential to a given punishment must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.62  Hence, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which allowed for judge-found facts to be the
basis of an increased sentence by a preponderance of the evidence,
were necessarily unconstitutional. 3
In addition, the Court voiced the philosophical concern that the
Guidelines allowed the power pendulum to swing too far in favor of
judges and too far away from juries.6' As sentencing ranges increased
and legislatures charged judges with finding facts that determined the
upper limits of sentences, the role of the jury greatly decreased.65 In
the words of the Court, "As the enhancements became greater, the
jury's finding of the underlying crime became less significant."
66
Essentially, Justice Stevens viewed the trend in sentencing as eroding
the right to a jury trial. While the words of the Sixth Amendment
would exist as part of the Constitution, the power of the jury would
be so diminutive as compared to that of judges that the essence of the
right to a trial by a jury would be rendered meaningless. 6 As Justice
Stevens wrote, deeming the Guidelines unconstitutional was "not
motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by the need to
preserve Sixth Amendment substance." 68
As applied to Booker, the Court stated that the increased
sentence was unconstitutional. Since the district court judge imposed
a sentence authorized by the jury facts but lower than that authorized
59. Id. at 233-34.
60. Id at 234, 236.
61. Id. at 236.
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id. at 233.
64. Id. at 236.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 237.
68. Id. It should also be noted that Justice Stevens dealt with the argument that doing
away with the Guidelines would impinge judicial efficiency. He handled these arguments
easily by noting that the efficiencies of the law had to bend to the fundamental legal
principles. Id. at 244.
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by the Guidelines, Fanfan's sentence was held not to violate the Sixth
Amendment.69  Nevertheless, the sentence was vacated for re-
sentencing consistent with the Court's opinion.0 However, the larger
question looming in front of the Court was not how to deal with
Booker and Fanfan's sentences, but rather how to deal with sentences
handed down before and after the Court's decision. Writing for a
majority different than that of Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer inked
the opinion addressing what should be done with the Guidelines
going forward.71
In the remedial section of Booker, Justice Breyer noted that
Guidelines could not stand as written and that severance and excision
of the unconstitutional portions was necessary.72 Most notably, the
provision that made the Guidelines binding on all judges was
removed, making the Guidelines discretionary.73 Going forward,
judges were to consult the Guidelines but were not bound by them.
7
Also, the Court recognized that the outcome in Booker would affect
appeals.75 To guide the courts in reviewing such cases, Justice Breyer
ended his opinion with the following:
As these dispositions indicate, we must apply today's holdings
- both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial
interpretation of the Sentencing Act - to all cases on direct
review. That fact does not mean that we believe that every
sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment violation. Nor do we
believe that every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing.
That is because we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary
prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the
issue was raised below and whether it fails the "plain-error"
test. 76
The Court gave no further explanation on how to apply these
tests, and the circuit courts have been forced to grapple with the
effects of Booker on sentencing appeals with relatively little guidance
from the Court.
69. Id. at 267.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 245.
72. Id. at 258.
73. Id. at 259.
74. Id. at 266.
75. Id. at 268.
76. Id.
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Il. The Fallout from the Booker Bomb
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.77
When a defendant fails to raise an objection on Sixth
Amendment grounds during trial, the appellate court may consider
the objection provided the defendant can show "plain error., 7' This
requirement has been codified as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(b), which reads, "A plain error that affects substantial rights may
be considered even though it was not brought to the court's
attention., 79 The purpose behind this rule is to "to prevent wholesale
reversals for immaterial and harmless error."'  As the Court stated,
"A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
8'
The Supreme Court in United States v. Olano provided a three
prong test for determining if something falls under the broad category
of "plain error:" there must be (1) an error,82 (2) the error must be
"plain,"'83 and (3) the error must "affect substantial rights."' If these
three requirements are met, the appellate court has the discretion to
correct the error if "in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result."'85 In applying the Olano test, the
lower courts have diverged in what plain error means in the context
of appeals on Booker claims. This divergence largely centers on what
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
79. Id.
80. Steele v. United States, 243 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1957).
81. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
82. "Error" is defined as "deviation from a legal rule...." United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993).
83. An error is plain if "clear" or "obvious." Id. at 734. An error need not be plain at
the time it is made. It need only be plain at the time of appeal to fulfill the second prong
of the Olano test. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,468 (1997).
84. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
85. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). Note this paper
will not discuss this point as it is more focused on courts application of Olano and their
finding of when something is actually plain error allowing for the exercise of discretion.
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"affect substantial rights" means in cases where a defendant's
sentence was unconstitutionally enhanced but no objection was made
during the trial. This split can be broadly framed into three
categories: (1) almost every unconstitutional sentence affects
substantial rights; (2) almost no unconstitutional sentence affects
substantial rights; and (3) we should go ask the trial judge if the
unconstitutional sentence affects substantial rights.86 While each of
these has a reasonable basis, they all suffer from drawbacks that leave
them flawed.
A. Almost Every Unconstitutional Sentence Affects Substantial Rights
On February 2, 2005, a mere twenty-one days after the opinion in
Booker came down, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Oliver took up the issue of how to deal with Booker error
87
when no objection was raised at trial. 8 As noted above, the "error"
and "plain" prongs of the Olano test are satisfied in the minds of
every circuit. However, Oliver's view of the third prong of the plain
error test has proven to be the most lenient. In the defendant's case,
the court overturned the sentence as plain error without a showing
that the Guidelines actually caused the judge to increase the sentence;
rather, the court noted that it was possible that the scheme of the
Guidelines could have led the judge to increase the sentence.
89
In Oliver, the defendant was charged with various drug-related
offenses and released on bond.' After testing positive for drugs, the
defendant's bond was modified to require that he be placed in a
residential halfway house and drug treatment program.9' After
roughly two months, the defendant left the halfway house without
permission.92 The defendant was later found at his residence. 93 The
Government alleged that the defendant made the following
confessions to police while at the residence: (1) he installed cameras
86. See Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com
/sentencing-law-and-policy/2005/03/threering-circu.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006)
(noting this three-way split and referring to the divergence among the federal cirucits as a
"three-ring circus").
87. From this point forward, "Booker error" will refer to unconstitutional sentences
like that in Booker.
88. 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005).
89. Id. at 380-81; see also United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).




to alert him of when police were approaching; (2) drugs had been
manufactured in the house that day; and (3) the defendant had used
drugs the day prior to his arrest.94 This evidence was allowed to come
in at trial and the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess
methamphetamines with the intent to distribute.9' During the
sentencing hearing, the judge found the flight from the halfway house
to be an obstruction of justice.96 This allowed the judge to sentence
the defendant to 180 months in prison, as opposed to using the range
of 135 to 168 months, which is the range supported by the jury's
findings alone. '
In considering whether the increased sentence substantially
affected Oliver's right, the court cited to United States v. Swanberg9,
and noted that "a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it
causes the defendant 'to receive a more severe sentence."'" Thus, in
the context of the Guidelines, the relevant question would seem to be
the following: did the unconstitutional federal sentencing scheme
cause the judge to increase the sentence beyond what would have
been given otherwise?' °° In looking to the effect on substantial rights,
the court stated, "As a result Oliver arguably received a sentence that
was longer than his sentence would have been absent a Sixth
Amendment violation."'0 ' Consequently, the court exercised its
discretion, found that the sentence "would diminish the integrity and
public reputation of the judicial system [and] also would diminish the
fairness of the criminal sentencing system," and overturned the
sentence.'0°
There is one very noteworthy point about this analysis that leads
the reader to question it. The verbal disconnect between the
94. Id. at 373-74.
95. Id. at 374.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 370 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2004).
99. Oliver, 397 F.3d at 379.
100. It should be noted that the relevant inquiry is whether a shorter sentence would
have been given if the judge had not been bound by the Guidelines and not whether the
sentence was above the applicable range. That is because Booker did not make the
sentences being handed down for given convictions unconstitutional. Rather, it was the
binding nature of the Guidelines. As such, the circuits must examine whether the sentence
would have been the same had the Guidelines been applied in the constitutional advisory
manner. See, e.g., United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005).
101. Oliver, 397 F.3d at 380 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
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standards of Swanberg and that employed in Oliver is obvious.
Swanberg directs that a sentence affects substantial rights when the
error causes the defendant to get a more severe sentence.0  Oliver,
on the other hand, requires that the defendant only show that he
arguably received a stiffer penalty." Anytime there is an enhanced
penalty, there is an argument to be made that that the defendant
received a sentence beyond what would have otherwise been handed
down. As such, Booker errors affect substantial rights.
Furthermore, even if this idea fits with the Sixth Circuit's
jurisprudence, it does not comport with Olano. Olano clearly states
that the third prong is that the error affect substantial rights, not that
there be a chance that it affect substantial rights."5 To apply the test
in a manner like the Sixth Circuit did is to conspicuously and illicitly
extend the Supreme Court's plain error rubric. Also, this undercuts
the purpose of the plain error analysis. The purpose of plain error is
to eliminate stale claims and maintain judicial efficiency.1°6  By
holding that the defendant need only make a showing that it is
possible that the error affected substantial rights eviscerates the plain
error doctrine and renders it unable to perform its intended purpose.
B. Almost No Unconstitutional Sentence Affects Substantial Rights
On the other end of the spectrum is the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in United States v. Mares.17 Coming roughly a
month and a half after the Court's opinion in Booker, Mares
represents a standard that is almost hopelessly unattainable for
defendants bringing appeals for Booker error." Under this approach,
appealing defendants must show that the sentencing judge would
have "reached a significantly different result" under a federal
sentencing system that was advisory.
In Mares, the defendant, Samuel Mares, Jr., and Alfredo
Martinez got into a physical altercation with two persons who
believed that Mares and Martinez had robbed them." During the
103. 370 F.3d at 629.
104. 397 F.3d at 380.
105. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
106. Steele v. United States, 243 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1957).
107. 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Antonakopolous, 399 F.3d
68, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).
108. Mares, 402 F.3d 511.
109. Id. at 521.
110. Id. at 513.
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fight, Mares was stabbed, and several witnesses testified that gunshots
were fired from the vehicle that Mares and Martinez used to flee the
scene."' The next morning, an ambulance arrived at the home of
Mares's girlfriend to treat Mares's stab wounds."' While loading
Mares into the ambulance, one of the paramedics noticed a bulky
object in Mares's pocket."3 He pulled it out and discovered it was a
magazine clip with 27 rounds of ammunition.'14 The district court
found Mares to be a felon in possession of ammunition. Based on
this finding, the trial court increased the base offense level from
twenty-four to twenty-eight and enhanced Mares's sentence based on
the finding that Mares had been in possession in connection with an
armed robbery."6
Much like the court in Oliver, Mares recognized that Booker
error was indeed an "error" and "plain," and thus satisfied the first
two prongs of Olano."7 However, the Mares court's conception of the
third prong provides a much higher bar for defendants to clear. The
court begins by noting that the purpose of holding appeals to a plain
error standard is to "encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful
reversals."".8 In the words of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, establishing prejudice "should not be too
easy."".9 In effectuating this goal, the Fifth Circuit stated its rule
regarding Booker error as follows: "Since the error was using extra
verdict enhancements to reach a sentence under Guidelines that bind
the judge, the pertinent question is whether Mares demonstrated that
the sentencing judge - sentencing under an advisory scheme rather
than a mandatory one - would have reached a significantly different
result."' O2 As this applied to Mares, the court found that there was no
indication in the record that the sentencing judge would have reached
a different conclusion under a constitutional sentence system. 2' As





115. Id. at 516.
116. Id. at 516-17.
117. Id. at 520-21.
118. Id. at 521.
119. Id. (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 522.
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was upheld. 22
The following language in Mares illustrates the problem with the
Fifth Circuit's approach: "there is no indication in the record ....
Forcing the appealing defendant to point to the trial record and state
with particularity the passages that indicate that the judge would have
ruled differently but for the mandatory nature of the Guidelines is an
exceedingly difficult task. In fact, the only sentences that will be
overturned are those that were given by the brooding judge who
happened to complain about the mechanics of the Guidelines. This is
an arbitrary way for deciding whether the denial of Sixth Amendment
rights amounts to plain error. The Fifth Circuit's approach asks not
whether the judge would have ruled differently knowing that the
Guidelines were advisory, but rather did the judge happen to ponder
the workings of the Guidelines and state for the record that in this
specific case he disagreed. This way of determining who gets a re-
sentencing hearing is problematic. It asks, "Did the judge happen to
state what he or she would have done?" as opposed to the simpler
question that more accurately reflects what the third prong of Olano
is meant to investigate: "What would the judge have done under
different circumstances?, 121 In short, the absence of statement in the
record cannot provide sufficient evidence of how a judge would have
sentenced in the post-Booker world.
C. We Should Go Ask the Trial Judge Whether the Unconstitutional
Sentence Affects Substantial Rights
Within six weeks of the Court issuing its opinion in Booker, the
upper and lower limits of what could be considered to affect
substantial rights had been set. In an effort to avoid the necessarily
over- and under-inclusive approaches mentioned above, Judge
Richard Posner and the Seventh Circuit announced a middle
approach in United States v. Paladino.125  Essentially, the Seventh
Circuit's approach was to "pass the buck" on the third prong of
Olano.126 Rather than trying to glean from the record whether the
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. As Mares itself put it, the relevant inquiry is whether "the sentencing judge -
sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one - would have reached
a significantly different result." Id. at 521.
125. 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. Id. at 483.
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judge would have acted differently17 or asking whether the
defendant's rights were arguably substantially affected,128 Judge
Posner promulgates the scheme of asking the actual sentencing judge
in the case whether he or she would have acted differently had the
Guidelines been different.
29
Paladino presented the appeals of several co-defendants who
were appealing convictions of a litany of federal crimes stemming
from a scam that defrauded investors of $11 million." ° Five of the co-
defendants (whose sentences ranged from 72 to 188 months) received
enhanced sentences that contravened the holding of Booker.1' These
enhancements had been based on determinations of fact by the judge
(such as being an organizer of the fraudulent conspiracy or a
supervisor of others involved in it, abusing a position of trust, etc.),
not the jury.132
Judge Posner's analysis of the plain error issue begins by
conceding that Booker error is indeed plain and an error, and thus
satisfies the first two prongs of Olano.'33 The Government made two
arguments in favor of upholding the defendants' sentences. One, the
sentences handed down followed the Guidelines, and since the
Guidelines still exist in an advisory form, the sentencing judge would
have probably done the same thing in the post-Booker regime.3 ' The
court dismissed this argument noting that the issue was not so black
and white.' Absent a statement on the record by the sentencing
judge that he or she would have given the same sentence, the court
could not say that under the advisory system the same sentence would
have been handed down.1 36 Two, the Government argued that since
the sentencing judge had not given the minimum sentence, it can be
inferred that the judge would not have given a lower sentence if not
bound by the Guidelines. "7 Judge Posner dispensed of this argument
equally quickly, noting that judges sentenced in relation to the
127. United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 380 (6th Cir. 2005).
128. Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
129. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483.
130. Id. at 474.
131. Id. at 479.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 481.
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sentencing ranges. As such, the sentences, although not at the
extremes of the range, were still necessarily influenced by the binding
nature of the unconstitutional scheme.38
Dispensing with arguments that would uphold the sentences
without question, Judge Posner moved on to laying out the middle
ground approach to the third prong of Olano in cases of Booker
error. 139 As a fundamental premise, Judge Posner stated, "It is a
miscarriage of justice to give a person an illegal sentence that
increases his punishment, just as it is to convict an innocent person.'
40
The court then noted that the opposite error is to believe that every
case of Booker error fulfilled the third prong because if the judge
would have given the same sentence, no true effect on the defendant
would have existed.'4 ' As such, Paladino sets forth the following
procedure: "The only practical way (and it happens also to be the
shortest, the easiest, the quickest, and the surest way) to determine
whether the kind of plain error argued in these cases has actually
occurred is to ask the district judge.' '4 2 The fundamental premise was
that the court would retain appellate jurisdiction over the matter but
order a limited remand which would ask the sentencing judge if he or
she would have sentenced the defendant differently and to provide
reasoning for this position.
3
The Seventh Circuit's methodology has the benefit of being the
Goldilocks of the Booker error world: It is not as harsh as Mares and
not as lenient as Oliver. Nevertheless, Judge Posner's system is
problematic. First, the Paladino dissents are quick to point out that
automatic limited remand will lead to nothing more than a cursory
look at the sentence.'44  In the words of Judge Ripple, "The
constitutional right at stake hardly is vindicated by a looks-all-right-
to-me assessment by a busy district court.' ' 15  Also, Judge Posner
138. Id. at 482-83.




143. Id. at 484. It should be noted that the Second Circuit in United States v. Crosby,
397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d
1073 (9th Cir. 2005), have adopted similar, but not identical, systems. While the Seventh
Circuit retains appellate jurisdiction, these other circuits do not. Ameline, 409 F.3d at
1080.
144. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 486 (Ripple, J., dissenting); see also id. at 488 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. at 486 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
stated that this system was "the shortest, the easiest, the quickest, and
the surest way. ..."" However, this very well may not be the case.
While it is short, easy, and quick for the appellate panel, it asks
already busy judges to go back into cases gone by and re-familiarize
themselves with a case that left the trial court years earlier.
Furthermore, one must ask whether it is really efficient for cases to be
bouncing back and forth from the appellate docket to the sentencing
judge's docket and back again. Finally, while Paladino attempts to
lay down an incredibly pragmatic way of evaluating the third prong, it
fails to anticipate the inevitable changes at the trial court level. When
a sentencing judge retires or dies, the appellate court loses the ability
to remand the case to the sentencing court. For those defendants
whose sentencing judge no longer occupies the bench, the question of
whether the sentence would have been different is necessarily
unanswerable. In short, the system of Paladino is hopelessly flawed.
IV. Booker Error As Structural Constitutional Error
In Antonakopoulos, the First Circuit flippantly tucked into a
footnote the following argument about the relationship between
Booker error and structural error:
Nor is [Booker error] structural error. In certain structural
error cases, those which "undermine the fairness of a criminal
proceeding as a whole," errors can be corrected regardless of an
individualized showing of prejudice to the defendant. Because
sentencing as under a mandatory system is not an error that
"undermines the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a
whole," ... a Booker type error is not a structural error....17
Though not being as blunt as the Antonakopoulos court, circuits
across the nation have refused to deem Booker error structural.
However, this position is an incorrect analysis of what is and is not
structural error. While auto-remand analyses like that of Oliver tend
to reach the proper result, the rationale is incorrect. The previously
discussed approaches to plain error are hopelessly misguided because
Booker error is structural error which, by definition, requires no
showing of effect on substantial rights to warrant re-sentencing.
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court created a dichotomy
between trial errors, which could be examined under plain
error/harmless error148 analyses, and structural errors, which require
146. Id. at 483 (majority opinion).
147. United States v. Antonakopoulos 399 F.3d 68, 80 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005).
148. It should be noted that harmless error is the counterpart to plain error. FED. R.
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automatic reversal. 1'9  This opinion was based on Chapman v.
California, which declared that "a constitutional error does not
automatically require reversal," but that some constitutional errors
are so grievous as to require reversal at all times.5° Chief Justice
Rehnquist then proceeded to draw a line between trial and structural
errors.' In the words of the Court, a trial error is an "error which
occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence."'52 On the other hand, structural errors are "defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis .... The
entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected
[by the error]."'53 Two years after Fulminante, the Court indicated
that the trial/structural error dichotomy was here to stay in Sullivan v.
Louisiana.5 4  In Sullivan, the Court reiterated the Fulminate
definition of structural error and noted that structural error covered
"'basic protection[s] whose precise effects are unmeasurable .... ""'
The line between what is a trial error and what is a structural
error is blurry at best. The troubling nature of applying the
Fulminante dichotomy led one commentator to state that "efforts
devoted by litigants and courts to comprehend and apply
Fulminante's [sic] dichotomy are doomed to fail."'56 Since this is the
case, the Court's decisions on what constitutes structural error almost
always contain a list of examples of structural errors.'57 Such errors
include, but are not limited to (1) complete denial of counsel,5 ' (2)
biased trial judge,59 (3) racial discrimination in selection of grand
CRIM. P. 52. While structural error usually comes up in the context of harmless error, the
general rule is structural error is never harmless error and always plain error. See United
States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (discussing how structural error is
plain error).
149. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
150. Id. at 306, 308 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
151. Id. at 307-10.
152. Id. at 307-08.
153. Id. at 309.
154. 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
155. Id. at 281.
156. David McCord, The "Trial"/"Structural" Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not
Harmless, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (1997).
157. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280; Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
158. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
159. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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jury,"6 (4) denial of self-representation, 6' (5) denial of a public trial, '62
and (6) defective reasonable-doubt instructions.'63  With these
examples in mind, and working off the language of Fulminante and
Sullivan, a two-part criteria for what constitutes structural error has
emerged. First, the error must affect a basic protection that deals
with reliability of the truth-finding process.' 6 Second, the impact of
the error must escape rationale review. 65 If these two criteria are
fulfilled, an error is plain error by default.
A. Booker Error As a Basic Protection
In Neder v. United States, the Court described the first prong of
the structural error inquiry in the following amorphous terms:
[A structural error is] a defect affecting the framework within
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself. Such errors infect the entire trial process, and
necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair. Put another
way, these errors deprive defendants of basic protections
without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence ... and no
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.
16
This description, while eloquent, fails to give much guidance on
how to locate the line between structural and trial errors. Fulminante
dispenses of any argument that all constitutional errors are structural
by making clear that "most constitutional errors can be harmless.'
67
Thus, though all constitutional rights are in some sense basic
protections, it is unclear when a constitutional right rises to the level
of basic protection pertaining to the reliability of the process
sufficient enough to fall into the structural error category.
Nevertheless, the location of the dividing line need not be decided for
the purposes of this article. This is because a strong analogy to a
former structural error case shows that Booker error is enough of a
"'basic protection[]' without which 'a criminal trial cannot reliably
160. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
161. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
162. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
163. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).
164. William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1424 (2001).
165. Id. at 1424-25.
166. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (internal citations and quotations
omitted; ellipsis in original).
167. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991).
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serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence"' to be considered structural in nature.168
In Sullivan, the Court determined that a constitutionally
deficient reasonable doubt instruction is a structural error.'6 Sullivan
was charged with first-degree murder in the course of committing
armed robbery. 70 During the trial, the judge gave a reasonable doubt
instruction to the jury that mirrored one that had been deemed
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana.171 Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, noted that the Sixth Amendment was
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice ... ,,17' He then
noted the interrelated nature of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and
that to violate the Fifth Amendment requirement that all elements be
found beyond a reasonable doubt would necessarily throw out of
balance the power structure between the judge and the jury.173
Justice Scalia's logic on the nature of the error unfolded in the
following manner. During a criminal proceeding, a judge may direct
a verdict in favor of the defendant if the evidence is legally
insufficient to establish guilt.7  However, no matter how
overwhelming the evidence is, the judge may not direct a verdict for
the plaintiff.' Justice Scalia postulated that failure to give a sufficient
instruction as to the burden of proof meant that juries were left
deciding if the defendant was "probably guilty.' ' 76 Then the judge
would step in and ascertain whether the evidence in the case leads to
the conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.'7 Such a method would step on the toes of juries, and the
Sixth Amendment as a whole, because "the jury verdict required by
the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."'78  Then, after discussing the standards set forth by
Fulminante, Justice Scalia applied the above logic and stated that a
deficient reasonable doubt instruction was structural error because
168. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
169. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).
170. Id. at 276.
171. Id. at 277.
172. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
173. Id. at 278.
174. Id. at 277.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 278.
177. Id.
178. Id.
"the jury guarantee [is] a 'basic protection' whose precise effects are
unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve
its function.,179
The unconstitutional instruction in Sullivan and Booker error
deal with two separate but related problems: burden of proof and
submission of issues to the jury. Dealing with the first problem, both
Sullivan and Booker error are indelibly stained by the inappropriate
standard of proof. In Sullivan, Justice Scalia stated that unguided
juries, when left to their own devices, would merely ask if the
defendant was "probably" guilty.1" Similarly, one of the troubling
aspects of Booker error is that judges find facts that raise the
sentencing ceiling by a preponderance of the evidence. A
preponderance of the evidence is equivalent to allowing juries to be
guided by a "probably guilty" standard and as such, mirrors one of
the major evils Justice Scalia was trying to avoid. Furthermore,
Sullivan showed concerns over the fact that issues were submitted to
the jury, but in the instance of a deficient beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
instruction, the judge became the ultimate arbiter of the verdict.
1 81
Likewise, the fundamental underpinning is that the judge, not the
jury, is the one finding the facts that lead to a sentencing
enhancement. In fact, Booker error is more egregious than the error
in Sullivan because in Sullivan the issue actually reached the jury.
Though the system in Sullivan was fundamentally flawed, the jury still
had an opportunity to weigh in on the finding of fact. In cases of
Booker error, no such opportunity was present.
In short, Sullivan declared that the Sixth Amendment is a basic
protection that weighs on the reliability of the trial. In that case, the
incorrect burden of proof and removal of the issue from the province
of the jury amounted to structural error."8 In instances of Booker
error, issues are found by the judge, not the jury, and by a burden of
proof lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Hence,
179. Id. at 281.
180. Id. at 278.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 281-82. Some may point to this language and say that Booker error does not
deprive a defendant of a jury because the majority of the issue relating to the guilt of the
accused reached the jury. This is incorrect because the issues taken out of the grasp of the
jury increase the sentence of the defendant. Under the former incarnation of the
Guidelines, this was tantamount to removing an entire cause of action with the sentence
the length of the enhancement. As such, the Supreme Court's deference to the Sixth
Amendment cannot be circumvented by noting that some of the sentence was pursuant to
a jury verdict. To maintain the intent and purpose of Rose, not allowing a jury to find facts
that increase the sentencing ceiling must be deemed structural errors.
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Booker error implicates the same basic protection and it flouts that
protection in the same way as Sullivan.
Beyond this, the idea that Booker error disregards a basic
protection is bolstered by language in the Supreme Court's decision
in Rose v. Clark.183 The Court in Rose said, "Where that right [to a
jury trial] is altogether denied, the State cannot contend that the
deprivation was harmless [and thus a structural error] because the
evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is
that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty."1" This quotation
has two effects. First, it is the ready-made counterpoint to those who
wish to invoke the following words of Fulminante: "most
constitutional errors can be harmless." '185 This may be the position of
the Supreme Court, but "most" is not "all," and it cannot be assumed
that, by virtue of these six words, Booker error is not structural.
Second, Rose evinces the Court's deference to the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment and lends credence to the idea that right to a jury
is a basic protection that cannot be lightly eschewed. This leaves little
doubt that the jurisprudence of the Court dictates that the right to a
jury is a basic protection that fulfills the first prong of the structural
error inquiry.
B. Booker Error As Unmeasurable
The second prong of the structural error requires that the error
"defy analysis by harmless [or plain] error standards .. .."'16 Provided
that an error can be analyzed in the context of other evidence, such
an error will be analyzed for plain error. 18 This prong's application to
Booker error, unlike the first prong, is more self-evident. The fact
that the error's impact is not measurable is the problem that plagues
the three approaches to plain error in Booker error cases discussed
above. In cases like Oliver, almost all plaintiffs are deemed to have
suffered plain error. However, this viewpoint rests not on an analysis
of any given evidence in the record that plain error occurred. On the
other hand, case like Mares present defendants with an almost
unprovable burden. This approach does not turn on whether plain
error occurred, but rather automatically assumes that it did not
because the court has no way of gleaning if it did. Finally, Paladino
183. 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
184. Id.
185. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991).
186. Id. at 309.
187. See id. at 310 (discussing this process in the context of involuntary confessions).
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seems to present a way to measure the error, but this remains fatally
flawed. The cursory review that is bound to take place and the reality
that judges leave the bench render this an option that is not viable.
Furthermore, unlike other types of error, the record tends not to
speak to the subject matter that Booker error deals with. For
example, in California v. Roy, the Court stated that a judge failing to
instruct a jury on an element of a crime was trial error because the
effect was not always unmeasurable.1 8 The premise was that other
evidence in the record could show whether this omission made a
difference.'9 Booker error is different because the record will almost
invariably be barren of information on the pertinent subject. Errors
like that in Roy can be analyzed in the context of the record because
the record deals largely with evidence that directly weighs on the
problem that the trial error created. However, Booker error is a
fundamentally different inquiry: what was the state of mind of the
judge at the time of sentencing? Would the judge have sentenced in
the same way if the Guidelines had been advisory? This is something
that the record rarely, if ever, exposes. For that reason, Booker error
cannot be said to be lumped into "trial error" category. Thus, with
these two prongs fulfilled, it is manifest that Booker error is structural
in nature."
Conclusion
When the Federal Sentencing Guidelines came to an end, a
188. 519 U.S. 2, 6 (1996).
189. Id. Some may try to draw analogy to this case and say that Booker error is akin to
omitting an element. This is incorrect for two reasons. One, as noted above, the evidence
in the record speaks to omission in Roy, but not to the judge's state of mind, which is the
relevant inquiry in cases of Booker error. Thus, Booker error is unmeasurable, while
omission of an element is not. Two, Justice Scalia seems to hint at the concern of a
slippery slope. Deeming omission of an element structural error could lead to
misdescription of an element to be deemed structural error. Id. at 5. Booker error, on the
other hand, is a more narrow class of errors that does not lend itself to such an extension.
As such, drawing comparison to Roy does little to undermine the position taken in this
article.
190. Recently (June 2006), the Court decided Washington v. Recuenco. 126 S. Ct.
2546 (2006). The core holding of Recuenco was that harmless error analysis could be
applied to Blakely errors. Id. at 2553. Outside of dealing only with Blakely error and
making no mention of Booker, the Court largely relied on Neder, a case dealing with
harmless error analysis when an instruction on an element is omitted. Id. at 2552. This
article previously pointed out the problems associated with comparing that type of error
and Booker error, supra note 188, and the Court did not have occasion to tackle the
arguments made in this article. As such, Recuenco does not change the position stated in
this article.
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whole new crop of problems were born. In dealing with unpreserved
Booker error, the circuit courts have been left drifting in an enormous
ocean sans compass. Because of this, a multi-way split on what plain
error means after Booker has emerged. This has meant that
defendants' chances of success on appeal have been largely dictated
by what circuit a given case is in and not the merits of the case.
While the more lenient approach to plain error tends to reach
the correct result, no circuit in the land has pegged the rationale. All
circuits have failed to detect that Booker error is structural and is
plain error by definition. Booker error both mirrors past errors and
defies measurement by looking at the record. Put simply, Booker
error is structural in nature and those defendants who have endured
Booker error should automatically be granted new sentencing
hearings.

